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In the spring of 1995, Oxford University was 
just beginning to give final examinations to 
the first students to undertake tutorials in a 
course titled “Soviet and Post-Soviet State and 
Law.” Soviet law had been studied for decades 
at Oxford, but post-Soviet law was new and at-
tracted only a trickle of students. They stud-
ied under the extraordinary Professor Bernard 
Rudden of Brasenose College. At the exami-
nation, copies were provided of the then-brand 
new 1993 Constitution, part I of the Civil 
Code, and Professor Butler’s collection of Basic 
Legal Documents. 
Oxford examinations take the form of writ-
ing several essays from a list of topics. Here is 
one of the most important of the topics of-
fered: “‘The new Constitution of the Russian 
Federation has achieved neither separation 
of powers nor a balance of powers.’ Discuss.” 
Students would have understood that coded 
language to ask for descriptive and normative 
evaluations of both horizontal power struc-
tures; that is, between branches of the federal 
government, and vertical power structures, be-
tween federal and regional governments. What 
would a good answer have looked like in the 
spring of 1995? 
Well, any able student could identify a va-
riety of hortatory and prescriptive provisions 
in the text of the Constitution, some scattered 
legislation, and a few judicial opinions. The 
better students might have concluded that, on 
its face, the Constitution’s super-presidential 
system did not seem to separate or balance 
power particularly well in either a horizontal 
or a vertical direction. Dangers lurked in am-
bivalent language and yet-to-be-used levers of 
power. But, the very best student would have 
continued. She would have observed that the 
question asked what had been achieved, not what 
the mere text of the new Constitution had de-
scribed. Her essay would have included an assess-
ment of the effects on federalism and the sepa-
ration of powers of an emerging party system, 
a history of regional claims to sovereignty and 
autonomy, and the de facto weakness of federal 
power in the mid-1990s to demand blood and 
treasure from regional powers like Mintimer 
Shaimiyev in Tatarstan, Murtaza Rakhimov in 
Bashkortostan, or Mikhail Nikolaev in Sakha-
Yakutia, not to mention the then ongoing first 
war in Chechnya.
This student would not have begun her 
analysis on December 12, 1993, when the 
Constitution was ratified under dubious con-
ditions, but rather on August 10, 1990, when 
Boris Yeltsin, then Chairman of the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet, addressed political elites in 
Kazan’ and urged them to “take as much in-
dependence as you can hold on to,” words re-
peated a few days later in Ufa with the more 
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popular variant, “take all the sovereignty you 
can swallow.” In that ambiguity between inde-
pendence and sovereignty was planted seeds of 
confusion that continue to haunt Russian feder-
alism. Independence and sovereignty, of course, 
are not the same thing, especially in the context 
of a federal system. But operating within the 
defective federal shell of the Soviet Union, the 
difference went unnoticed for awhile.
This student would have observed how that 
speech unleashed a torrent of declarations of sov-
ereignty from the regions. These declarations—
although of no legal significance—had real re-
percussions. Some regions paid taxes, delivered 
conscripts, and enforced federal law while other 
regions did not, seemingly with impunity. As 
different regions took different views of what 
their sovereign status meant, this affected the 
negotiation of the first Federal Treaty and the 
1993 Constitution that ultimately repudiated 
the more decentralized bargain that that treaty 
had struck. Some regions felt betrayed by the 
rejection of a treaty that they felt had established 
the foundations of a new relationship with 
Moscow. One region actually sought to secede. 
And more than half negotiated special bilateral 
relations with Moscow that established varying 
degrees of fidelity to the constitutional division 
of powers and subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
legal status of these early bilateral treaties was as 
shaky as that of the declarations of sovereignty 
that preceded them. Some of them were signed 
in secret, none of them were ratified by legisla-
tures at any level.
None of this, of course, was immediately ob-
vious or predictable from a facial assessment of 
constitutional text. Federal structure could create 
power, and create limits on power, as important 
as more easily identified textual commands. 
History, too, could inform how both textual 
and structural constitutional claims should be 
assessed. Such constitutional glosses are com-
mon, especially in systems of government as 
complicated as federal systems.
But that was years ago. What if the same 
bright Oxford student were to write on the same 
examination question today? The essay would 
look very different. She would probably not lin-
ger very long with the text of the Constitution 
before describing a succession of federal statutes, 
especially those passed at the start of Vladimir 
Putin’s first term as president. As you know, 
these federal laws and presidential decrees ended 
the bilateral treaty process. One statute ousted 
regional governors and parliamentary chairmen 
as ex officio members of the upper chamber of the 
Federal Assembly, the Council of the Federation. 
By decree, federal districts were created that 
broadly overlapped existing military districts. 
Federal overseers, men who were mostly of high 
military rank, were appointed by President Putin. 
Another statute gave the federal president pow-
ers to dismiss regional executives, regional legis-
latures and municipal governments. In addition, 
President Putin acquired the statutory power to 
appoint regional executives himself (thus ending 
all direct elections for heads of regional govern-
ments throughout the Federation). Other than 
the federal president, the only remaining execu-
tive officials subject to direct, popular election 
are mayors.
Even more recent legislation has ended di-
rect representation of single-mandate constitu-
encies in the lower chamber, the State Duma. 
The cumulative result, therefore, is that every 
region of Russia now has a chief executive 
nominated by the federal president and remov-
able by him, and no region of Russia has any 
direct representative to the Federal Assembly 
with anything remotely similar to an electoral 
constituency in that region. That shift from po-
litical accountability to the people—whom the 
Constitution repeatedly describes as the bearers 
of sovereignty and the single source of power in 
Russia—has deprived the Russian Federation of 
one of the core protections in a federal system 
against over-centralization: the political pro-
cess. There exists what Associate Justice David 
Souter of the United States Supreme Court re-
ferred to as “the political component of federal-
ism.” In words that referenced the “founding 
fathers” of the American federal republic, but 
which sound eerily prescient for a Russia then 
flush with petro-dollars, he underlined how 
important this was for a federal system. Politics, 
he wrote, “should mediate between state and 
national interests as the strength and legislative 
jurisdiction of the National Government inevi-
tably increased through the expected growth of 
the national economy.” 
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The student may well have described these 
measures as part of the swing of a pendulum, a 
reaction to the extreme weakness of the federal 
center under Yeltsin and increasing legal con-
fusion caused by his parade of bilateral treaties 
and agreements. The student would also now 
have plenty of federal Constitutional Court 
opinions to evaluate. He or she would have 
noted the Court’s early ambivalence about is-
suing rulings about federal-regional relations, 
the inconsistency of its early opinions and their 
low rate of compliance under Yeltsin, followed 
by the Court’s more aggressive enforcement of 
President Putin’s so-called federal reforms. The 
student would note that what had been achieved 
was not solely a function of constitutional text, 
but owed much to political forces and to the 
unhappy memory of the 1990s. The text of the 
Constitution was sufficiently vague to permit 
an extraordinary shift of power between the 
regions and the federal government without 
any significant amendment at all. But this shift 
was accomplished by devaluing structural con-
straints on that text placed on it by core prin-
ciples of federalism.
In my book, which was published in 2002, 
I observed the start of this swing of the pendu-
lum during Putin’s first few years in office. I 
forecast that this malleable constitution, on its 
own, would no more stop extreme centraliza-
tion under President Putin than it had stopped 
the extreme decentralization of federal-regional 
relations under President Yeltsin. At least part of 
what was required was the strengthening of fed-
eral and regional institutions to ensure that fed-
eral and regional powers respected the spheres 
of authority of each, and a strong, independent 
Constitutional Court that could interpret the 
Constitution with integrity and fidelity to both 
the text and the structural principles embedded 
in that document. The likelihood that even this 
wish list would suffice, however, was under-
mined by the failure of federal and regional po-
litical elites to come to a consensus about exact-
ly what those structural principles actually were 
and in what foundational document they were 
to be found. Vladimir Putin’s so-called dicta-
torship of law had certainly ended the parade 
of declarations and bilateral treaties launched by 
Yeltsin’s famous call to “take all the sovereignty 
you can swallow.” But it had not, indeed could 
not have had the intention of resolving the un-
derlying philosophical differences between fed-
eral and regional elites: Was this a federation 
based on a constitution or a treaty? Was this a 
federation in which the regions were granted 
their governing authority by a supremely sover-
eign Moscow? Or was it Moscow that derived 
its limited powers from regions that had ceded 
some, but not all, of their sovereignty to the 
center? In other words, Russia did not adopt a 
federal system based on an agreed foundation of 
the most basic principles of federalism.
The inherent attraction of federalism 
is that, to borrow a phrase from Associate 
Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States 
Supreme Court, federalism “split the atom of 
sovereignty.” That idea unleashes opportunities 
for spectacular innovation, generates dynamos 
for economic progress, and establishes overlap-
ping forums for democratic self-government. It 
creates economies of scale and a whole much 
greater than the sum of its parts. Federalism 
creates multiple sources of sovereignty within a 
single state, endowing or preserving each sov-
ereign entity with spheres of authority that are 
simultaneously co-ordinate and independent. 
The regional and federal governments are de-
pendent on one another, and yet each possesses 
jurisdictions constitutionally protected against 
intrusion by the other. 
This division of sovereignty has another ad-
vantage, particularly important for Russia. As 
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted: 
“Federalism secures to citizens the liberties that 
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” 
Put another way, also in O’Connor’s words, “A 
healthy balance of power between the States 
and the Federal Government will reduce the 
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” In 
the structure of federalism is thus a protection 
of individual rights that can be more potent 
than their mere identification in a list. In other 
words, text alone does not protect liberty, con-
stitutional structures do, too. 
Those structures are almost gone in Russia. 
At the request of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law, I wrote a report last fall 
(co-authored with Alexei Trochev and Nikolay 
Balayan) on the unification of law in the Russian 
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Federation. I presented our findings in Mexico 
City four months ago, as part of a larger proj-
ect that compared the unification of law in 23 
federal systems worldwide. The conclusions of 
both our national report and the general report 
are startling when considered in Russia’s his-
torical perspective. Compared to other federal 
systems, Russia’s legal system is among the most 
unified in the world. It is almost certainly the 
most centralized system in the world that still 
claims to be federal. 
The text of the Constitution identifies eigh-
teen subjects over which jurisdiction is al-
located to the central government. Fourteen 
subjects are allocated to the joint authority of 
the central government and regions. Subjects 
not specifically allocated are left to the regions. 
Notwithstanding this division, all of these sub-
ject areas are, for all practical purposes, under 
the control of the central government to the 
degree that it desires to exercise such control. 
The default rule in Russia is that that ques-
tion—what is inherently local in nature—is a 
question for the central government alone to 
decide. Therefore, all laws and normative legal 
acts of the regions in areas of joint jurisdiction 
must be issued in accordance with the federal 
law on the issue. The Constitutional Court has 
upheld the central government’s view that in 
areas of joint authority, the central government 
takes the leading role in establishing the space 
left for local law-making, even when that space 
is a null set. No historical or structural gloss ap-
pears to temper this engorgement of power.
Federal law often operates throughout Russia 
directly, unmediated by regional law. Thus, the 
law of contracts, torts, property, business or-
ganizations, and other aspects of private and 
commercial law (subjects that other federal sys-
tems may leave to the jurisdiction of the com-
ponent states) are all governed exclusively by 
federal law. Through a system of codification, 
the central government regulates all civil law, 
civil procedure, criminal law, criminal proce-
dure, administrative law and procedure, and 
the procedure for use in the commercial courts. 
There are federal codes governing the use of 
land, air, water, and forests. Federal codes also 
govern all labor law and family law. There are 
codes for the citing and construction of towns, 
housing, collection of taxes and customs du-
ties, and the regulation of government budgets. 
Even the form of government within the region 
is not the exclusive prerogative of that region. 
My colleagues and I were hard pressed to iden-
tify meaningful spheres of jurisdiction within 
the exclusive sovereign power of the subjects of 
the federation. With the exception of certain 
limited controls over linguistic and cultural 
practices, these do not appear to exist. From 
the point of view of federalism, this is a terri-
ble state of affairs. As then-United States Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist observed, a federal 
constitution “requires a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local.” 
The current relationship between Moscow 
and the regions is a relationship that I am no 
longer certain may be described as federal in 
any meaningful sense of that word. It lacks 
now many of the structural features of federal-
ism that I have identified: a division of sover-
eignty in which each entity is simultaneously 
co-ordinate and independent; a political com-
ponent that protects this division between what 
is truly national and what is truly local; and 
an understanding that in dividing power both 
horizontally and vertically there is a structural 
protection for individual rights that manifests 
itself as much in regional legal distinctions as in 
autonomy. Russia today presents an example of 
what can happen when constitutional text is in-
terpreted in a vacuum, with too little attention 
to identifying these foundational principles, and 
little attempt to make structural and historical 
arguments to interpret constitutional text with 
fidelity to those principles. Arguments and con-
clusions drawn from constitutional structure 
and history are as valid and as important tools 
of constitutional interpretation as argument 
from the plain meaning of the text. Indeed, 
structure and history stabilize a text and pre-
vent the sort of pendulum swings that we have 
seen in Russia. But these tools—as important 
to a legislature as to a judiciary—have not been 
used in Russia. And the longer they go unused, 
the more difficult their use will become. Let 
me give you one example.
In December 2005, the Constitutional Court 
upheld the constitutionality of President Putin’s 
new power to nominate governors for regional 
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confirmation, thus ending their direct election. 
Will Pomeranz has written an excellent analysis 
of this case that you will soon be able to read in 
Demokratizatsiya, but let me briefly note some of 
the opinion’s features and omissions. The Court 
noted the variety of direct and indirect ways 
that the Constitution provided for filling fed-
eral executive and representative offices: some 
elected, some ex officio, some textually pro-
scribed, others left to be established by statute. 
“Thus,” the Court concluded, “the possibility 
of different variants of endowing with author-
ity organs and offices of public power, which 
are not directly named in the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation as elected,” leaves open 
the possibility of change as to how to fill these 
positions. The Court concluded that if the text 
is silent, this alteration is constitutional.
But the Court never mentions provisions 
of the Constitution that support the broader 
structural protections of federalism against the 
drumbeat of a unified executive. For example, 
the Court concludes that regional executives 
are “links” in the chain of a “unified system 
of state power”. Thus, regional executives, it 
says “stand in relations of subordination direct-
ly to the President of the Russian Federation” 
based on the latter’s direct, nationwide popular 
election. But this interpretation would render 
Article 85 of the Constitution meaningless, 
since this article limits the President’s powers 
to resolve differences between federal and re-
gional organs of state power to that of “concil-
iatory procedures.” Such a limitation would be 
strange indeed if regional executives were mere 
subordinates of the federal president.
This manner of reasoning—deriving per-
mitted avenues of organizing state power from 
the absence of textual restrictions—is to recast 
a constitution as a mere code. But the plain 
meaning of the text, or the absence of any text, 
is not the only source of constitutional authori-
ty. The structure of the Constitution establishes 
prohibitions as forcefully as the text can. The 
federal structure and recent history of Russia 
provide strong arguments against such a read-
ing of the text.
I have already mentioned the political com-
ponent of federalism and the need for genuine 
distinctions between what is truly national and 
what is truly local. Federalism, although found 
in many variations in many countries, does 
have a certain base meaning. There is more to 
a written constitution than the plain meaning 
of its text. And yet the Constitutional Court of 
the Russian Federation has found it relatively 
easy to subordinate those principles to the prin-
ciple of the “unity of the system of state power” 
in Articles 5 and 77 of the Constitution. That 
phrase would seem to be best understood as 
limited by federal principles rather than as plac-
ing a limit on federal principles. Read in the 
context of a federal constitution, that language 
does not necessarily lead one to support the idea 
of an “executive vertical.” 
In conclusion, let me say this. You will have 
noticed that I have flecked my remarks with 
quotations from justices on the United States 
Supreme Court. I did this deliberately, per-
haps unduly provocatively, but not to suggest 
that American federalism is a model for anyone 
to follow. American federalism is probably the 
worst possible approach for Russia or any other 
multi-national, multi-ethnic, or multi-lingual 
country. These justices are not talking about 
American federalism, they are talking about 
principles of federalism in the abstract. These 
principles include: that there be a meaning-
ful distinction between what is truly national 
and what is truly local; a political component 
of federalism that creates multiple levels of di-
rect political accountability; that power is suf-
ficiently diffused to protect individual liberty 
from attack by either local or national powers. 
What is more, these justices made these 
arguments not by looking to the text of an 
American document, but by looking at the 
structures that a federal constitution creates. 
The word “federal”, after all, is not to be found 
anywhere in the text of the U.S. Constitution. 
Each quotation is from a case decided in the last 
fifteen years (i.e. during the new era of federal-
ism that it was hoped the Russian Constitution 
had introduced). The Russian Constitution 
has been interpreted with insufficient atten-
tion to these principles of federalism, principles 
derived as much from its structure as from its 
unique recent history as from its text. Instead, 
the Constitution’s text has too often been over-
privileged and read in a vacuum to render in-
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terpretations that are ahistorical and contrary to 
the structures of the federal state that it pur-
ports to create. 
The Oxford exam I mentioned at the start of 
my remarks included more than one opportuni-
ty for the student to discuss Russian federalism. 
The very next question on that exam provided 
a quotation from the great Dutch scholar of 
Soviet and Russian law, Ferdinand Feldbrugge, 
who rightly concluded: “The Soviet Union was 
a unitary state which masqueraded as a federa-
tion.” The student was asked whether he agreed 
with this assessment and whether things in 
Russia were now different. The able student in 
1995 might have pointed to the disparity be-
tween formal Soviet structures and actual prac-
tice to draw conclusions about that entity, but 
accept the invitation of the question to advance 
a more optimistic view based on the text of the 
new Constitution. 
There is little reason for optimism about 
federalism in Russia in the near term unless, 
like Mikhail Gorbachev in his time, Dmitry 
Medvedev should surprise us in his. The 
Constitution has thus far escaped substan-
tial amendment by way of Chapter 9 of the 
Constitution. And yet, in the short span of fif-
teen years its federal structure has been almost 
completely undone. That is a bad sign. Worse 
than a constitution that is buried under the 
weight of constant amendment is a constitution 
that, in the face of systemic institutional change, 
need not be amended much at all. Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
